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Abstract 
The present research examined how situational and individual difference factors 
influence majority-group observers’ evaluations of witnesses’ responses to an incident 
of bias. In Study 1, participants learned of a situation in which a White person applying 
for a job that he did or did not need (high vs. low cost of confrontation) heard his 
interviewer make a racist comment, which the White person did or did not confront. 
Non-confrontation was evaluated as less appropriate than confrontation when the costs 
of confronting were low, but not when costs were high, revealing that in a high cost 
situation, the appropriate response to bias is more ambiguous. Study 2 focused on this 
high cost situation to show that evaluations of another person’s responses to bias depend 
on individual differences in the observer’s values. Observers who scored low on 
Universalism-Concern evaluated another person’s non-confrontation as appropriate as 
confrontation, but participants who scored high on Universalism-Concern perceived 
non-confrontation as less appropriate. Considering how responses to bias are assessed 
helps illuminate normative processes that affect confrontations of bias against 
outgroups, contributing to the knowledge of the processes that may allow biases to 
persist. 
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Evaluations of Witnesses’ Responses to Bias: Universalism-Concern and the Costs 
of Confrontation 
1. Introduction 
Recent research has aimed to understand when targets of bias confront unfair 
negative comments and actions directed toward them or their group (see, for example, a 
recent special issue on confrontation of sexism; Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014). 
That research also considers how individual differences, such as in beliefs about the 
malleability of prejudice (Rattan & Dweck, 2010) or optimism (Kaiser & Miller, 2004), 
among targets of bias can increase or decrease their willingness to confront this bias. 
However, confronting bias is not solely the responsibility of members of targeted, 
disadvantaged groups; how members of majority groups not only perceive injustice 
(Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996) but also evaluate the responses of others 
to injustice can affect the persistence and impact of social bias in society. In the present 
research, consisting of two studies, we investigated how majority-group members 
evaluate other ingroup members who do or do not confront racial bias against another 
group. Specifically, we tested the potential moderating roles of (a) the social conditions 
under which the person decided whether to confront the bias (Study 1), and (b) 
individual differences in the values held by observers of the other person’s response to 
bias (Study 2).  
With respect to social conditions under which bias is confronted, previous 
research in prosocial actions has highlighted that the inherent costs associated with a 
particular action can decrease the extent that action is perceived as appropriate. For 
instance, although helping behaviors are generally evaluated positively, when helping 
involves greater personal cost to the person who intervenes (e.g., greater personal risk), 
not intervening is perceived to be a more socially acceptable response (Holahan, 1977; 
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Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981).  Indeed, people often justify not 
intervening to help another person on the basis of the potential costs incurred for 
helping (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). We expected a similar effect to 
occur in evaluations of confrontational behavior, based on the work conceptualizing 
confrontation of bias by a witness as a form of prosocial behavior in which people 
weigh the costs and benefits of various courses of action (Ashburn-Nardo, Blanchar, 
Petersson, Morris, & Goodwin, 2014; Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Penner et 
al., 2005).  
We hypothesized that confrontation of bias would be evaluated more positively 
than non-confrontation by majority-group observers, in line with previous work 
(Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012). Confrontations of bias address socially unfair 
treatment and preserve egalitarian norms and, therefore, may be generally seen by 
observers as positive social behaviors. Likewise, non-confrontations are likely 
perceived as less appropriate, because they allow a biased remark to remain 
unchallenged, and may even convey agreement with bias.  
However, there are likely exceptions to this general negative assessment of non-
confrontations of bias. Under some conditions, observers may recognize that the 
personal costs to a witness for confronting bias are high and may outweigh the cost to 
society of not confronting a socially unfair behavior.  In these circumstances, non-
confrontation may be perceived as excusable and not be seen as a less socially 
appropriate response than confrontation. Thus, in situations in which the personal costs 
of confronting are high, the appropriate response to bias may be ambiguous, and non-
confrontation of bias may be viewed as a socially acceptable behavior. We tested this 
hypothesis in Study 1.  
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Whereas Study 1 aimed to investigate how observers assess the appropriateness 
of not confronting (vs. confronting) as a function of situational factors affecting 
personal costs for intervention, Study 2 focused on individual differences that influence 
observers’ evaluations of different responses to bias in situations in which the cost to a 
witness for confronting bias is high.  
Previous research demonstrates that in situations where behavioral 
appropriateness is ambiguous, individual differences among observers are particularly 
important guides of behavior. As Mischel (1973) explained, “Individual differences can 
determine behavior most strongly when the situation is ambiguously structured … so 
that subjects are uncertain about how to categorize it” (p. 276; see also Snyder & Ickes, 
1985). Confrontations by individual targets are shaped by personal factors, such as 
commitment to fight bias or optimism, affecting perceptions of the costs and rewards of 
confronting or not an expression of bias (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Shelton, Richeson, 
Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). Similarly, in situations where the personal costs of confronting 
are at odds with the social costs of not confronting bias, individual differences among 
observers would likely shape their perception of the appropriateness of reactions to bias.  
However, we are not aware of any research investigating the influence of values 
in judgments about whether it is appropriate to confront bias. Values are general beliefs 
that guide not only people’s selection of actions but also evaluations of their own and 
other people’s behaviors (Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), particularly members of their own group’s (Marques & Paez, 
1994; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Values would likely be important predictors of the weight 
given to different costs and rewards in confronting or not confronting bias, because 
values directly define the standards by which action (or inaction) is judged.  Thus, in 
Study 2, we hypothesized that majority-group observers’ evaluations of responses to 
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bias would be related to their endorsement of a value related to the degree to which 
equality is held as a central standard of behavior – Universalism. Universalism is one of 
the values proposed on Schwartz’s (1992) theory of basic human values, which aims to 
capture a comprehensive and cross-culturally valid set of values and to describe the 
relations among those values.  
Schwartz’s (1992) original theory of basic human values identified 10 basic 
human values (Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, 
Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism) that can be organized into a 
circular continuum, according to compatibilities and conflicts among them. Cross-
cultural research in more than 80 countries (e.g., Australia, Brazil, Portugal and the US) 
and with diverse samples supported the comprehensiveness of this set of values, their 
relationships, and their broad applicability (see Schwartz, 1992; 2012; Schwartz et al., 
2012; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & Owens, 2001). The theory of 
basic human values has been used in research on diverse topics, such as political 
behavior (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), self-affirmation (e.g., Burson, 
Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012) and altruism (e.g., Lӧnnqvist, Leikas, Paunonen, 
Nissinen, Verkasalo, 2006). 
Universalism, the value of primary focus in Study 2, is defined as a motivation 
to understand, appreciate, tolerate, and protect all people and nature. Universalism is 
closely (and positively) related to Benevolence. However, Benevolence is defined as a 
motivation to care for the welfare of people with whom one is close and therefore has a 
relatively narrow focus of application. By contrast, Universalism is related to concerns 
about the welfare of others more generally. Both Universalism and Benevolence are in 
conflict with Power (a motivation to attain social status and prestige, and control or 
dominance over people and resources) and Achievement (a motivation to be personally 
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successful according to social standards), in the sense that an action that expresses the 
former values tends to be incompatible with an action that expresses the later values 
(Schwartz, 1992).  
While Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement and Power are all related to 
traditional measures of social bias, Universalism is the value most strongly related to 
measures of prejudice and social dominance (e.g., Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & 
Kielmann, 2005; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008) – individuals who 
endorse the value of Universalism score lower on these measures. In addition, although 
both Benevolence and Universalism (but not other values in the model) are important 
predictors of prosocial behaviors (e.g., Caprara, Alessandri & Eisenberg, 2012; Caprara 
& Steca, 2007), Universalism is more related conceptually to prosocial actions toward 
other people in general, not just toward others with whom one is close (Schwartz, 
2010). Because values affect behavior mainly when they are activated by a specific 
situation (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) and the value of Universalism captures whether 
equality is held as a central standard of behavior, we hypothesized that Universalism 
would be the primary value in guiding evaluations of confrontations (and non-
confrontations) of bias. 
In addition, Schwartz and colleagues (2012) recently refined the theory of basic 
human values and identified three subtypes of Universalism: Universalism-Nature, a 
motivation to preserve the natural environment; Universalism-tolerance, a motivation to 
accept and understand people who are different from oneself; and Universalism-
Concern a “commitment to equality, justice and protection for all people” (Schwartz et 
al., 2012, p. 669).  
To the extent that Universalism-Concern specifically reflects a motivation to 
strive for social justice and equality, even at personal expense, when appraising the 
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appropriateness of different responses to bias, people relatively high on this value would 
likely give more weight to the social cost of not confronting, even when there are 
potentially mitigating personal costs associated with confronting. In Study 2, we apply 
the situation identified in Study 1, where the personal costs of confronting are at odds 
with the social costs of not confronting, to test the unique effects of Universalism-
Concern, over and above other basic values in Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined theory on 
observers’ assessments of the appropriateness of non-confrontation versus confrontation 
of bias.  
Theoretically, expanding the study of confrontation to how others evaluate those 
who do or do not confront bias can broaden the perspective on the general social forces 
that can either ameliorate or maintain social bias.  Practically, understanding the 
influences on non-targets who witness bias can have important social consequences, as 
non-targets who confront are taken more seriously and are seen as more persuasive than 
confronters who are the target of bias (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, Mark, & 
Monteith, 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Investigating how observers evaluate 
witnesses’ decision to confront bias or not, and the conditions that may shape that 
assessment, can provide insight into the process that socially inhibit unfair bias, as the 
perceived appropriateness of different behaviors can influence people’s decisions in 
intergroup contexts (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1997).  
2. Study 1 
2.1 Overview 
In Study 1, participants (all from a majority group) learned of a situation in 
which a White applicant heard his interviewer make a biased comment about Black 
applicants and then did or did not confront the interviewer about that comment. We also 
varied the social circumstances of the applicant by indicating that he had a high versus 
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low need for the position for which he was interviewing. The dependent measure was 
how appropriate participants perceived the behavior of the applicant.  
Because confronting tends to be seen as a prosocial behavior that preserves 
egalitarian norms, we expected that a White witness confronting an expression of bias 
against a Black person would generally be seen as more appropriate social behavior 
than would non-confrontation. However, we further hypothesized that this effect would 
be diminished when the personal costs to the witness for confronting bias were 
relatively high (i.e., the applicant had a high vs. low need for the job). The costs of 
confronting would make non-confrontation more excusable and, thus, more appropriate. 
Both studies in the present paper were conducted with Portuguese participants. 
Previous research has suggested that discrimination against Black immigrants in 
Portugal is generally condemned by social norms (e.g., Vala, Lopes, & Lima, 2008; 
Vala & Pereira, 2012). Concurrently, however, Black immigrants still report being the 
target of verbal harassment more often than other immigrant or ethnic groups (Santos, 
Oliveira, Kumar, Rosário, & Brigadeiro, 2009). Thus, we expected that participants 
would find the situation presented in these studies plausible and would consider the 
blatantly biased comment as unfair and inappropriate. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants. Because the theoretical focus in the research was on responses of 
members of the majority racial group as a function of whether another member of their 
group confronted bias against a racial minority group, Portuguese undergraduate 
students (n = 87; 55 men, 31 women, 1 did not specify gender; mean age = 20.69 years, 
SD = 4.05) were included in the analyses. An additional 19 participants who completed 
the study but indicated a different nationality were not included in the final analyses. 
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Participants were recruited as volunteers through the university, and they completed the 
survey in class with no direct compensation.  
2.2.3. Design and procedure. The study employed a 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. 
Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) between-groups factorial 
design. Similar to the procedure of Shelton and Stewart (2004, Study 1), participants 
were presented with a scenario in which a candidate was being interviewed for a job. In 
this scenario, the interviewer indicated that he was favorably impressed by interviewee 
Paulo (a name selected because it is one of the most common names for White 
Portuguese men), but followed that with a racist comment about Black applicants for 
the same position.  The potential cost to the interviewee for confronting biased remark 
was varied by information in the scenario suggesting that the interviewee had a high 
need for the job (high cost for confrontation) or a low need for the position (low cost of 
confrontation). Specifically, the participants read the following text (low need for the 
job condition in brackets):  
Paulo is in a room waiting to be called for a job interview. This interview is 
[not] very important to Paulo because this is his third job interview in 
months and no one has offered him a job yet [he already received some 
interesting job offers]. Paulo [doesn’t want] wants to give his best shot at 
this interview because he [doesn’t] really needs the job. Plus, this position 
[does not seem] seems really interesting and he [doesn’t want the 
opportunity to work in the company that much] would love the opportunity 
to work in the company. Paulo is called in to the interview. He is greeted by 
the interviewer, a tall white man wearing a suit. They both sit down and he 
starts asking Paulo questions. Paulo has the impression that the interview is 
going well. In the end, the interviewer shakes his hand and says: I really 
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liked you and I think you and the company would be a good fit. We had a 
lot of Black applicants, so it’s good to have someone White for a change. 
I’ll contact you when we have a decision. 
We then varied the description of the behavior after the interviewer’s racist 
comment. In the Confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee 
(Paulo) answered, “I don’t think skin color should have anything to do with this.” In the 
Non-confrontation condition, participants were told that the interviewee stated simply, 
“I’ll be waiting for your call.”  
After participants read the scenario, they completed items measuring their 
perceptions of the appropriateness of the interviewee’s behavior during the interview. In 
particular, participants were asked to evaluate, from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much, the 
degree to which the interviewee’s behavior reflected four qualities: appropriate, wise, 
and (reverse-coded) irrational and unreasonable. The responses were submitted to an 
exploratory factor analysis (using the principal axis factoring method of extraction), 
which revealed only one factor that explained 60.34% of the variance (eigenvalue = 
2.41; factor loadings from .69 to .82). The responses to the four items were averaged to 
form a behavior appropriateness scale, α = .79. 
After assessing the perceived appropriateness of the interviewee’s behavior in 
the scenario, to evaluate the effectiveness of the manipulations, we asked participants to 
rate, on separate 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scales, how important it was for him to 
get the job and the likelihood that he would be offered the position. Finally, we asked 
participants for their age, gender and nationality.  
2.3. Results 
The manipulation produced the intended effects on the perceptions of 
participants. A 2 (Need for the Job: High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. 
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Non-Confrontation) analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded, as expected, a main effect 
of need for the job on the importance to the interviewee of getting the job, F(1,83) = 
939.13, p < .001, η2p = .92. Participants in the high need for the job condition perceived 
that it was more important for the interviewee to get the job (M = 6.87, SD = .40) than 
participants in the low need for the job condition (M = 2.05, SD = .96). There was no 
effect for Behavior (p = .898) and no interaction effect (p = .283).  Also, as anticipated, 
participants perceived that the interviewee would incur personal costs for confronting 
the interviewer about the racist remark.  A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the likelihood that the 
interviewee would receive the job offer revealed a main effect for Behavior, F(1,83) = 
14.11, p < .001, η2p = .15.  Participants in the confrontation condition perceived that he 
would be less likely to receive the job offer (M = 4.80, SD = 1.38) than those in the non-
confrontation condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.02).  There was also a marginally significant 
main effect of cost, F(1,83) = 3.56, p = .063, η2p = .04. Participants in the high need 
condition perceived it was less likely for the interviewee to get the job (M = 5.09, SD = 
1.40) than participants in the high cost condition (M = 5.52, SD = 1.13).  We found no 
interaction effect (p = .745). 
Addressing our primary research question, we conducted a 2 (Need for the Job: 
High vs. Low) x 2 (Behavior: Confrontation vs. Non-Confrontation) ANOVA on 
behavior appropriateness.  There was, as expected, a main effect of confrontation, 
F(1,83) = 17.78, p < .001, η2p = .18. Participants in the confrontation condition judged 
the behavior as more appropriate (M = 5.83, SD = 1.14) than participants in the non-
confrontation condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.38). Importantly, this effect was qualified by 
a significant interaction between Need and Behavior, F(1,83) = 9.32, p = .016, η2p = .07 
(see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Evaluations of behavior appropriateness for each experimental 
condition of Study 1. 
 
Planned comparisons revealed that when the costs were low, there was a 
significant difference between confronting and not confronting, F(1,83) = 21.71, p < 
.001, η2p = .21, such that confronting was evaluated as more appropriate (M = 6.10, SD 
= .78) than not confronting (M = 4.32, SD = 1.50). However, when the costs were high 
there was no significant difference between confronting (M = 5.54, SD = 1.38) and not 
confronting (M = 5.07, SD = 1.20), F(1,83) = 1.58, p = .212, η2p = .02.  From an 
alternative perspective, when the interviewee confronted the interviewer about his racist 
comment, the interviewee’s behavior was rated as equivalently socially appropriate 
whether his need for the job was high (and thus the costs for confrontation were high) or 
low, Ms = 5.54 vs. 6.10, F(1,83) = 2.13, p = .148, η2p = .03. However, not confronting 
the comment was viewed as more socially appropriate when the interviewee’s need for 
the job was high than when it was low (Ms = 5.07 vs. 4.32, F(1,83) = 4.16, p = .044, η2p 
= .05). 
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2.4. Discussion 
 The current study complements previous research, which shows that people are 
less likely to confront a biased remark when the costs of confronting are higher 
(Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004), by investigating how others 
perceive the behavior of individuals in such situations. Consistent with previous 
research (Dickter et al., 2012), the results of Study 1 demonstrated that when an 
individual blatantly exhibits bias, participants perceived confrontation as a more 
socially appropriate response than non-confrontation. While this finding may appear 
intuitive, future research might further investigate the processes contributing to this 
evaluation.  For example, one reason why confrontation may be viewed so favorably is 
because such actions are positively distinctive: Majority-group members rarely respond 
to expressions of prejudice (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009). Another 
reason why the type of confrontation represented in Study 1 may be viewed positively is 
because the bias was directed toward a group for which there are strong norms against 
biased treatment (Blacks), and the interviewee had no immediate self-interest in 
confronting the interviewer (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). It is possible that 
confronting a biased statement about another group would be perceived as less socially 
appropriate if the norms regarding prejudice against that group are less strong (e.g., 
overweight people) or possibly even support negative treatment (e.g., criminals) 
(Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002).   
 Study 1, however, further demonstrates that how people evaluate non-
confrontation of bias depends upon their understanding of the circumstances of the 
other person who does not intervene. Importantly, Study 1 extends previous research by 
offering direct evidence of the moderating role of perceived mitigating circumstances 
on how inappropriate non-confrontation of even blatant bias is perceived.  Specifically, 
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although confrontation of bias was generally seen as more socially appropriate than 
non-confrontation of bias, majority-group observers tended to excuse non-
confrontation, rating it as more socially appropriate (and as socially appropriate as 
confronting bias) when the costs to a witness of confronting bias are relatively high (i.e., 
not getting a job that was needed). Practically, the present results suggest that people 
who encounter an incident of bias may face different types of costs (or lack of rewards) 
for action or inaction, some emanating directly from the perpetrator (e.g., a boss) but 
others associated with the way observers evaluate their behavior. 
Study 1 suggests that majority-group observers are responsive to at least two 
different types of social forces in judging the appropriateness of confronting or not 
confronting expressions of racial bias.  On the one hand, observers seem sensitive to 
prevailing egalitarian norms against racial bias and, as a consequence, evaluate a White 
person’s confrontation of racial bias by another White person as more socially 
appropriate than a non-confrontation of such behavior.  On the other hand, observers are 
responsive to the circumstances that a witness of bias encounters in making a decision 
about whether to confront.  Specifically, observers appear more willing to excuse a 
witness for non-confronting bias when such action may involve greater personal cost. 
When these two factors – the cost to society for not intervening and the cost to 
an individual for confronting bias – are in conflict, the appropriate response to bias 
becomes more ambiguous. In this situation – our situation of interest in Study 2, we 
hypothesized that the cost that is weighted the most would depend on individual 
differences between observers. People who value social justice more would be more 
sensitive to the social costs of not confronting a behavior that violates egalitarian norms. 
Thus, they would perceive non-confrontation as less socially appropriated, even when 
the costs for confrontation are high. We tested this hypothesis in Study 2. 
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3. Study 2 
3.1. Overview 
Study 2 examined whether the endorsement of Universalism-Concern predicts 
how majority-group observers evaluate a confrontation of bias versus a non-
confrontation in a situation where the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous (i.e., 
the high need/high cost situation, identified in Study 1). We tested the unique effects of 
Universalism-Concern over and above the effects of other values, which complement or 
are in conflict with Universalism-Concern (Universalism-Tolerance, Universalism-
Nature, Benevolence-Dependability, Benevolence-Caring, Achievement, Power-
Dominance, and Power-Resources) in Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined values theory. As 
noted earlier, the value of Universalism-Concern distinctively emphasizes the 
importance of the value of equality in the treatment of others generally, and this value is 
likely to be activated when people are exposed to an incident of injustice, such as bias 
(Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
We hypothesized that when a witness’s personal interests are in conflict with the 
general social interest in limiting expressions of bias, individual differences in 
observers’ commitment to strive for equality would be important predictors of their 
evaluations of responses to bias. Specifically, we predicted that whereas participants 
who scored lower in Universalism-Concern would perceive a non-confrontation as 
appropriate as a confrontation (the result for the high-cost situation in Study 1), those 
higher in Universalism-Concern would perceive non-confrontation as less appropriate 
than confrontation (the results we observed in the low-cost situation of Study 1), giving 
more weight to the social cost of not addressing an unfair treatment in their judgments.  
3.2. Method 
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3.2.1. Participants.  One hundred and twenty Portuguese undergraduate students 
completed the study (60 men, 60 women; mean age = 21.84 years, SD = 3.61). They 
received no compensation for their participation. 
3.2.2. Design and Procedure. Participants were recruited in a university library. All 
students present at the library at the recruitment time were approached and asked to 
complete the survey. They task was described as an evaluation task were they had to 
give their opinion about another person’s behavior in a social situation. The 
experimenters were unaware of the condition presented in the survey they asked 
participants to complete. 
Participants were first asked to respond on a 6-point scale (1 = not like me at all, 
2 = not like me, 3 = a little like me, 4 = somewhat like me, 5 = like me, 6 = very much 
like me) to the three Universalism-Concern items of the Schwartz et al. (2012) revised 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-5X): “Here we briefly describe some people. 
Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like 
you:” “Protecting society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to him[her]”; 
“He [she] thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities 
in life”; “He [she] wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he/she doesn’t 
know.” The scale showed good reliability in the current sample (α = .72).  The items 
were embedded among items from Schwartz and colleagues’ (2012) PVQ-5X 
measuring seven other related values: Universalism-Tolerance (motivation for accepting 
and understanding people who are different from oneself), Universalism-Nature 
(motivation for preserving nature), Benevolence-Dependability (motivation for being a 
dependable ingroup member), Benevolence-Caring (motivation for caring for other 
ingroup members), Achievement (motivation to succeed according to social standards), 
Power-Dominance (motivation for having power through control of other people), and 
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Power-Resources (motivation for having power through control of material and social 
resources) (Schwartz et al., 2012). Because we believed that the scenario would be the 
mainly related to concerns about social justice, we did not have specific predictions for 
individual differences in these additional values. However, we included this items in 
order to investigate the unique predictive ability of Universalism-Concern, not only 
relative to other Universalism values but also, more broadly, to other self-transcendence 
and self-enhancement values. 
Then, participants read in the survey the scenario representing the high cost 
context of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two confrontation 
conditions varied in Study 1. In one condition the interviewee confronted the 
interviewer who made a racist comment; in the other condition the interviewee did not 
confront the interviewer. After reading the scenario, participants answered the same 
Behavior Appropriateness items (appropriate, wise, irrational and unreasonable) of 
Study 1 (α = .77). Then, participants were asked to indicate (from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much) their perceptions of the interviewer’s behavior as (a) prejudiced, (b) 
appropriate, and (c) fair. Responses (reverse-coded for fair and appropriate) were 
averaged to produce a measure of perceived bias (α = .82). At the end of the survey we 
asked participants to recall whether the interviewee’s had confronted or not confronted 
the prejudiced comment (as an attention check) and to provide information about their 
age, gender, and nationality1. All participants indicated they were Portuguese. We 
excluded from the final sample 11 participants who failed to correctly answer the 
attention check2. Thus, the final sample was composed by 109 participants. 
3.3. Results 
To test how participants perceived the interviewer’s behavior, we regressed 
perceptions of bias on Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded), 
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Universalism-Concern (centered) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction 
term. As expected, the way participants rated the interviewer’s behavior was not 
predicted by their endorsement of Universalism-Concern or by the behavior of the 
interviewee.  The overall model was not significant (p = .161), and there were no main 
or interaction effects (p’s > .130).   Overall, participants viewed the interviewer’s 
behavior as generally biased, M = 6.33, SD = .97, on the 1-7 scale). 
 In order to test our main hypotheses, we regressed behavior appropriateness on 
Behavior (confrontation vs. non-confrontation, dummy-coded), Universalism-Concern 
(centered; M = 4.52, SD = .89) and the Behavior x Universalism-Concern interaction 
term. The model explained a significant amount of variance in behavior 
appropriateness, adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 105) = 3.67, p = .015. There was a significant 
effect of Behavior on behavior appropriateness, B = .53, SE = .27, p = .050, η2p = .03. 
The interviewee’s behavior was perceived as more appropriate when he confronted (M 
= 5.02, SD = 1.22) than when he did not confront (M = 4.49, SD = 1.57). Importantly, 
this effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between Behavior and Universalism-
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Figure 2. Predicted behavior appropriateness scores as a function of 
experimental condition and participants’ endorsement of the Universalism-Concern 
value. 
 
Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed, as predicted, that among 
participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern (i.e., one standard deviation 
above the mean), there was a significant effect of Behavior, B = 1.25, SE = .38, p = 
.002, η2p = .09: participants who scored higher in Universalism-Concern perceived 
confronting bias as more appropriate (estimated mean = 5.45) than not confronting bias 
(estimated mean = 4.21). Among participants who scored lower in Universalism-
Concern (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean), however, we found no 
significant effect of Behavior, B = -.18, SE = .38, p = .637, η2p < .01. As expected, 
participants lower in Universalism-Concern evaluated non- confrontation (estimated 
mean = 4.90) as appropriate as confrontation (estimated mean = 4.73) in these 
circumstances.3 
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Supplementary analyses revealed that the Behavior x Universalism-Concern 
interaction remained significant after controlling for the seven other values in the 
Schwartz scale, B = .81, SE = .32, p = .013, η2p = .06. No other scale showed an 
interaction with Behavior in comparable analyses. 
3.4. Discussion 
Study 2 results support our hypothesis that individual differences in 
Universalism-Concern moderate how majority-group observers evaluate responses to 
bias when the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous. Under circumstances in which 
the personal costs to a witness for confronting bias are high – in this case, jeopardizing 
being hired for a job that is needed – participants lower in Universalism-Concern judged 
non-confrontation as equivalently appropriate as confrontation. By contrast, participants 
higher in Universalism-Concern, who are highly committed to the value of equality, 
perceived non-confrontation as less appropriate than confrontation.  This effect occurs 
because participants higher in Universalism-Concern tended to view both confrontation 
as more socially appropriate and non-confrontation as less appropriate.   
Previous work has demonstrated that greater endorsement of the higher-order 
value of Universalism (Schwartz, 1992) predicts a range of behaviors reflecting concern 
for the welfare of others (Feather & Mckee, 2012; Kuntz, Davidov, Schwartz, & 
Schmidt, 2015; see also Schwartz, 2010). Although less research specifically tested the 
more differentiated values of the Schwartz and colleagues’ (2012) revised theory, the 
evidence that does exist indicates that greater endorsement of Universalism-Concern 
specifically predicts responses supporting social justice better than other forms of 
Universalism.  In particular, Universalism-Concern (which represents a commitment to 
social justice) is a better predictor of attitudes favoring equal rights for immigrants and 
homosexuals than Universalism-Nature (which reflects a concern for preserving the 
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natural environment), and a better predictor of opposition to economic inequality than 
Universalism-Tolerance (which measures a motivation for accepting and understanding 
people different from the self) (Schwartz et al., 2012; see also Schwartz & Butenko, 
2014).  
The results of Study 2 further support the distinctive effects of Universalism-
Concern for affirming general principles of social justice.  Perception of how biased the 
interviewer was did not vary as a function of the participant’s endorsement of 
Universalism-Concern, but differences in this value did affect the way the witness’s 
behavior was evaluated. In particular, in Study 2 we found that participants who scored 
higher in Universalism-Concern perceived a non-confrontation as a less socially 
appropriate behavior, even when the witness could incur in substantial personal cost for 
confronting bias. This effect remains even when controlling for their endorsement of 
other values (including Universalism-Nature and Universalism-Tolerance). Participants 
who scored low in Universalism-Concern apparently viewed high personal cost for 
intervention as a mitigating factor for not confronting; they judged non-confrontation as 
socially appropriate as confrontation under these circumstances. Thus, in addition to 
extending work on confrontation of bias by identifying a particularly relevant individual 
difference variable that may moderate evaluations of a decision to confront bias, our 
findings offer further evidence of the discriminant validity of Universalism-Concern, as 
distinguished from other forms of Universalism (Nature and Tolerance) and other types 
of individual values.  
Both Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability are positively related 
to Universalism values (together, they form the higher-order value of self-
transcendence). However, Benevolence-Caring and Benevolence-Dependability scales 
were designed by Schwartz et al. (2012) to reflect motivations to care about the welfare 
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of ingroup members and to be a dependable member of the ingroup, respectively. , 
Perhaps because the scenario made social justice concerns more salient than concerns 
about other ingroup members, we did not find a relation between either of the 
Benevolence values and the extent a confrontation was perceived to be appropriate.  
4. General Discussion 
The present studies revealed that the perceived appropriateness of a witness’s 
response to bias depends both on situational and personal factors. In Study 1, majority-
group observers evaluated non-confrontation of bias as less appropriate than 
confrontation when the personal costs of confronting were low. However, the same did 
not happen but not when the personal costs of confronting were high. These results 
suggest that when the personal costs of confronting are at odds with the social costs of 
not confronting, the appropriate response to bias is ambiguous.  
Study 1 results laid the ground for Study 2, which investigated how individual 
differences predict evaluations of responses to bias. Study 2 results showed that 
observers’ personal values related to equality and social justice predicted their 
evaluations of confrontations when the appropriate response to bias was ambiguous. In 
this situation, participants who scored lower on Universalism-Concern evaluate non-
confrontation as appropriate as confrontation, while participants who scored higher on 
Universalism-Concern perceived non-confrontation to be less appropriate.  
Taken together, these two studies suggest that majority-group observers attend to 
two different types of costs, and potentially benefits, associated with witnesses’ 
responses to racially biased comments. On the one hand, confronting the biased remark 
appears to represent a socially valued behavior, particularly by majority-group 
observers who endorse Universalism-Concern more strongly. Allowing bias to remain 
unchallenged would permit the violation of basic social principles of fairness and 
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justice, fundamental pillars of society (e.g., Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011; Tyler & 
Blader, 2003), which would be especially aversive for people highly committed to 
equality. On the other hand, majority-group observers also appeared to attend to the 
personal cost that a witness to bias could potentially incur for confronting bias.  
Participants, especially those lower in Universalism-Concern, judged non-confrontation 
as socially appropriate as confrontation when the costs for this action (potentially not 
being hired for a job that was needed) were high. That is, for majority-group members 
less committed to equality and social justice, the costs of confronting seem to constitute 
valid excuses for not confronting.  
To our knowledge, the present research is the first to explore how individual 
differences shape majority-group observers’ perceptions of the appropriateness of 
different responses to bias, highlighting the important role of endorsing Universalism-
Concern. In addition, the current results contribute to the validation of the Schwartz’s 
refined Theory of Basic Individual Values by showing that Universalism-Concern, but 
not other universalism values, predicts evaluations of behaviors related to social justice. 
Although that was not the main goal of the present research, our studies underscore the 
distinctiveness of each of the three factors (Universalism-Concern, Universalism-
Tolerance, and Universalism-Nature) that are usually collapsed into a single higher-
order value.  
Because people tend to be sensitive to social perceptions of what is an 
appropriate conduct in intergroup behaviors (Blanz, et al., 1997; Franco & Maas, 1999; 
Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Paluck, 2009; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009), evaluations of 
reactions to bias may constitute an important influence that may help or hinder 
witnesses’ confrontation. Our research suggests that people face different types of costs 
for deciding to confront or not bias. While confronting may entail some costs arising 
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from the person being confronted, not confronting may also be penalized by others who 
observe their behavior.  Thus, our work broadens the consideration of costs and benefits 
associated with majority-group member’s decisions on how to respond to bias 
(Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014; Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Good et al., 2012; Kaiser 
& Miller, 2004). This is particularly relevant considering that witnesses who confront 
may be particularly effective in reducing further bias (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gulker, 
et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).  
It should be noted that, in the present research, we investigated how observers 
from a majority group evaluated responses to bias when both the confronter and the 
confronted person are members of a majority group. There are reasons to believe that 
group membership affects observers’ evaluations of responses to bias. Majority group 
members tend to be less sensitive to prejudice (Blodorn, O'Brien, & Kordys, 2011; 
Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Inman & Baron, 1996), and observers who are not targets of 
prejudice tend to be less supportive of confrontations of bias than observers who belong 
to the target group (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001). 
It is expectable that evaluations of the appropriateness of confronting are influenced by 
whether the observer is a member of a minority group and/or a member of the target 
group. Future research might further investigate whether the observers’ group 
memberships influence their evaluations of responses to bias. 
Methodologically, although we manipulated the perceived cost to witnesses for 
confronting bias in Study 1, we did not directly assess participants’ perceptions of the 
costs or benefit to the witness or to society for the alternative behaviors.  We did not 
include such measures before asking how socially appropriate participants perceived the 
witness behavior because we did not want to sensitize participants to the specific 
predictions of the work.  Measuring perceived costs and benefits after assessing 
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perceptions of social appropriateness may reflect post hoc justifications for ratings of 
social appropriateness rather than true mediating mechanisms.  Moreover, conceptually, 
observers may not be consciously aware of their processes of weighing different costs 
and benefits in shaping their assessments (Piliavin et al., 1981; Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977).  Nevertheless, future research might consider indirect measures of the attention 
people devote to either the personal or social costs in their consideration of the situation, 
for example by measuring the relative cognitive accessibility in a lexical decision task 
(Kay & Jost, 2003) of words associated with social justice (e.g., equality) and words 
associated with the consequences for the witness (e.g., employment). These indirect 
measures would mediate how people judge the social appropriateness of confronting or 
not confronting bias.  
Future work may also investigate how individual differences in Universalism-
Concern or other factors (such as individual differences in the extent participants share 
the interviewer’s bias against the target of the remark; see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) 
may moderate the weight majority-group observers give to alternative costs for 
confrontation or non-confrontation by a witness.  Although the present research 
constitutes a first step in that direction, understanding more fully and directly how 
individual differences influence the way people attend to and weigh different types of 
costs (and benefits) may provide more conceptual insight in how people respond to 
instances of social injustice.  
We note a seemingly inconsistent finding between Study 1 and Study 2. Across 
the situations involving potentially high personal costs for confronting bias, we found 
that participants low in Universalism-Concern in Study 2 viewed non-confrontation 
slightly but not significantly more appropriate than confrontation, participants in Study 
1 (in which Universalism was not assessed) on averaged perceived non-confrontation as 
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somewhat less appropriate than confrontation, and participants high in Universalism-
Concern in Study 2 evaluated non-confrontation as significantly less appropriate than 
confrontation.  However, this apparent inconsistency may be accounted for by statistical 
considerations.  In particular, while the size of the effect of Behavior (confrontation vs. 
non-confrontation) on judgments of appropriateness were comparable in Study 2 (η2p = 
.03) and in Study 1 (η2p = .02), there were over twice as many participants in Study 2 (n 
= 109) than in the high cost condition of Study 1 (n = 45). Statistical power is a function 
of sample size. Indeed, estimates of statistical power using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that the power to detect a small-sized effect was .52 in 
Study 2, but only .25 in Study 1.  Thus the non-significant effect for Behavior in the 
high-cost condition of Study 1 but significant effect in Study 2 is likely a function 
primarily of the statistical sensitivity of the test not a difference in the size of the effect. 
We assessed Universalism-Concern, along with other six scales in Schwartz and 
colleagues’ (2012) value inventory at the very beginning of Study 2, before the 
manipulation and the assessment of the dependent variables, because it was 
hypothesized to represent a moderator of the effect of the manipulation of confrontation 
versus non-confrontation.  It is possible that including the value items first in the 
procedure might operate as a kind of prosocial prime.  However, inconsistent with a 
general prosocial prime interpretation of our findings, Universalism-Concern 
systematically moderated responses to the manipulation even when controlling for the 
other values in Schwartz et al.’s instrument.  Nevertheless, methodologically, future 
work might present the value scales at the very beginning and very end of the study 
(counterbalanced) to assess any order, and potential priming, effects. 
Another limitation of the present research is that we relied on a scenario 
methodology to assess participants’ evaluations of a witness’ behavior. Indeed, a 
EVALUATIONS OF RESPONSES TO BIAS  28 
number of studies of responses to an incident of bias have used scenarios (Ashburn-
Nardo et al., 2014; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & 
LaFrance, 2001) or retrospective reports of responses (Good et al., 2012; Kaiser & 
Miller, 2004), in addition to immediate and spontaneous reactions to an incident. We 
used the scenario methodology for the experimental control it provides for manipulating 
specific elements of the situation and our interest in a particular outcome – judgments of 
social appropriateness. Perceptions of what behaviors are socially appropriate or 
inappropriate are particularly important, because perceptions of normative 
appropriateness can guide behavior, including intergroup behavior, in ways independent 
of personal attitudes (e.g., Paluck, 2009). Nevertheless, because people’s descriptions of 
what they would do in situations portrayed in scenarios, particularly in the context of 
confrontations of bias (Kawakami et al., 2009; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), do not 
always match their behavior when presented with the actual incident, future research 
might productively investigate how people respond to others who do or do not confront 
bias in more immediately unfolding and compelling situations. In an actual situation 
that directly involves them, observers may spontaneously weigh the social costs of not 
confronting and the personal costs of confronting differently, in line with the finding 
that targets of prejudice imagine they would be less influenced by the confrontation 
costs than they actual are (Shelton & Stewart, 2004).  This kind of finding suggests that 
future work on how observers evaluate whether someone confronts bias or not should 
compare the responses of observers detached from the situation, as in the present 
research, to those more immediate involved in the situation that unfolds.   
Individuals may be less likely to confront bias than they expect because of 
cognitive and affective processes.  In particular, concerns about how confrontation may 
undermine social harmony represent a cost for confrontation that may be more salient, 
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and thus weighed more heavily, when people who are more detached from the situation 
predict how they will respond to bias.  In addition, affectively, majority-group members 
report that they will be more emotionally upset by witnessing an act of bias than they 
experience in the actual situation (Kawakami et al., 2009). If majority-group observers 
closer to the immediate situation experience less upset in response to a racist comment, 
they would also likely evaluate non-confrontation by a witness as more appropriate.  
Thus, future research on how observers judge the appropriateness of a witness’s 
decision to confront or not confront bias might productively consider proximity to the 
actual incident and the associated salience of various costs and benefits as important 
moderators of perceptions of the social appropriateness for the witness’s behavior. 
In conclusion, the present research offers a complementary perspective to 
previous research on whether people confront bias in understanding the dynamics 
involved in confronting bias.  Our work focused on how majority-group observers 
perceive another person’s response after witnessing bias, in terms of social 
appropriateness. Both situational factors (costs to the witness for confronting bias) and 
individual differences (in the degree to which observers endorse Universalism-Concern) 
systematically shape these evaluations.  Considering how observers assess the 
appropriateness of alternative behaviors helps illuminate the normative processes that 
may ultimately affect whether people confront bias against members of another group, 
painting a more complete and complex picture of the processes that may allow 
traditional biases to persist socially or to combat it through social and interpersonal 
interventions. 
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Footnotes 
1. We conducted regression analyses using gender and age as control variables. We 
found no significant effects of either age or gender, and including these variables as 
controls did not change the pattern of results.  
2. Participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check were evenly 
distributed across conditions, Χ2(1, N = 120) = .10, p = .752. 
3. From an alternative perspective, simple slopes analyses demonstrate that participants 
higher in Universalism-Concern tended to perceive the behavior of the interviewee as 
more appropriate when he confronted bias, B = .42, SE = .23, p = .068, η2p = .03, and as 
less appropriate when the interviewee did not confront bias, B = -.40, SE = .21, p = .063, 
η2p = .03. 
 
 
 
